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This article focuses on the post-Soviet recollections of Soviet-era mahalla community by
ordinary citizens in contemporary Uzbekistan. The primary message of this paper is that
the community has historically represented one of only a few effective traditional struc-
tures that can unite representatives of various ethnic and religious groups through the
creation of a common identity based on shared residence. However, throughout history of
these communities, political authorities have often attempted to manipulate these in-
stitutions to enhance the state’s legitimacy. This type of manipulation has challenged the
essential nature of residents’ attachment to their communities and called the authority
and legitimacy of mahalla structures into question.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.0. Introduction
The Central Asian states are currently implementing
structural reforms and are transitioning to new forms of
society building. These states face a number of challenges,
such as the “de-ideologisation”, democratisation and
“marketisation” of their societies. To address these chal-
lenges, the majority of Central Asian states follow the top-
down scheme of decision making in their approaches to
various issues in their societies. This decision-making
process frequently results in a disengaged and detached
populace, which leads to policy outcomes that are inef-
fective and counterproductive with respect to the initiallyarch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hapursued goals. Thus, to both understand and implement
reforms that will foster a prosperous and conﬂict-free so-
ciety, a new approach must be adopted that not only con-
siders global demands but also accounts for local needs and
traditional approaches exempliﬁed by community-based
organizations.
This paper focuses on one such indigenous institution:
the neighbourhood community, or mahalla. Although
Central Asian local communities, such as mahallas, have
gained considerable prominence in recent years, no
consensus has been achieved regarding the role of these
communities either during Soviet times or during the con-
struction of the new states and societies that have formed in
the Central Asian region in the post-Soviet period. Although
a large body of literature addresses pre-Soviet mahallas
(Komatsu, 1978; Sukhareva, 1958, 1962, 1966, 1976;
Sukhareva & Tursunov, 1982), relatively little research has
addressed the Soviet-era mahalla, particularly with respect
to communal life. Although several authors have recently
attempted to seriously analyse the post-Soviet mahalla,
their works are either primarily descriptive rather than
analytical (e.g., Abramson, 1998; Abdullaev, 2005;nyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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focus on an analysis that compares modern mahallas with
other local communities (e.g., Kandiyoti, 1998, 2007;
Rasanayagam, 2002a, 2002b).
Although the present article builds its analysis on the
ﬁndings of previous studies, it emphasises the importance
of not only conducting a case study of the past or present
shape of the mahalla but also examining the inter-
connections between perceptions of the Soviet-era mahalla
and the understanding of the mahalla in the post-Soviet
context. Therefore, this paper focuses on the sociocultural
construction of a new understanding of the mahalla in
Uzbekistan and the ways in which cultural identity and
memories of the Soviet era inﬂuence this process.
This paper primarily seeks to address the following set
of questions. First, what were the characteristics of the
mahalla in Uzbekistan during the Soviet era? How do
people remember their neighbourhood communities?
Second, under Soviet rule, did Uzbeks consider the mahalla
to be a government-afﬁliated unit or a non-governmental
(unofﬁcial), indigenous network? What was the relation-
ship between the Soviet state institutions and the mahalla,
and what was the difference between these institutions in
public perceptions? Third, howdid Soviet policies inﬂuence
the attitude of the Uzbek populace towards their commu-
nities? Did these policies strengthen the public support for
mahallas or change the understanding of the nature of the
mahalla among ordinary community members?
Within the framework above, this study will investigate
how and to what extent the mahalla was previously
regarded as a government-afﬁliated unit or as a non-
governmental (unofﬁcial), indigenous network. For situa-
tions in which both an ofﬁcial and an unofﬁcial mahalla
existed within the same locality, this investigation seeks to
explain the relationship between these two mahallas and
identify how they differed in terms of structure and func-
tion. This study will also examine the nature of the public
support that was enjoyed by mahallas during Soviet
rule and, in particular, whether the Soviet-era mahalla is
remembered as an all-inclusive geographical community or
as a structure that united certain individuals based on
ethnic, professional and/or other afﬁliations, excluding a
subset of the residents of each region.
The primary message of this paper is that the commu-
nity has historically represented one of only a few effective
traditional structures that can unite representatives of
various ethnic and religious groups through the creation of
a common identity based on shared residence in a partic-
ular Central Asian region, such as Uzbekistan. In addition,
although Central Asian societies face a variety of possible
dangers, such as environmental hazards and economic
shortcomings, these problems cannot be addressed
without localising public dissatisfaction and creating public
consent within smaller communities, such as mahallas.
However, throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet history of
these communities, political authorities have often
attempted to manipulate these institutions to enhance the
state’s legitimacy with respect to not only the state’s pop-
ulation but also other governments. This type of manipu-
lation has challenged the essential nature of residents’
attachment to their communities and called the authorityand legitimacy of mahalla structures into question. More-
over, this manipulation has resulted in a new and prag-
matic two-level mentality among the affected populace. In
particular, Central Asian residents exhibit ritualistic devo-
tion to public interests (which are allegedly pursued by
mahallas); however, particularly in the post-Soviet envi-
ronment, these residents also pursue their private interests,
disregarding the interests of other members of their
communities.
Methodologically, this paper builds on previously pub-
lished studies on the role of the community in Soviet times
and utilises extensive descriptive interviews (involving
semi-structured questions) with 75 elderly citizens of
Uzbekistan of various ethnic groups (consisting primarily
of urban residents of 7 major cities) that were conducted
between 2005 and 2009 in Uzbekistan and addressed the
topic of ordinary individuals’ experiences of life during the
Soviet era.
1. Placing the mahalla between public and private life
1.1. Civil society organization or state institution?
There are divided perspectives regarding the role of
local communities in Central Asian societies. Certain
studies of local communities in Central Asia, particularly
mahalla, treat these organisations as institutions that
represent the local populace in interactions with local
governments. Similar studies focus on the identity-related
contributions that these communities provide, emphasis-
ing the mutual assistance and inclusiveness that are found
in these organisations and the social meeting spaces that
they represent. In a social context, these investigations
often regard these communities as institutions that are
composed of the local population and serve the purpose of
defending the rights of this population in disputes with
various governmental and non-governmental institutions.
Therefore, these types of studies conceptualise mahalla as
units of civil society (G’ulomov, 2003; Jalilov, 1995, 1999a,
1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b; Rakhimov &
Musaqulov, 2005 etc.).
The opposing camp of scholars emphasises the notion
that although mahalla and similar communities are
frequently composed of the local populace and serve
certain local residents, this ostensible role merely disguises
the true nature of these communities. In reality, theyare the
institutions operationalised or “ofﬁcialised” by the state to
forward the governmental agenda (Kandiyoti, 2007). These
researchers argue that “these [communities] and other
quasi-ofﬁcial networks do not seem to be vehicles for the
bottom-up collective action, but for enforcement of top-
down government directives and [the] efﬁcient allocation
of development aid” (Kandiyoti, 2007; Troschke, 2012, p.
54). These studies emphasise that the policy of ofﬁcialising
mahallas and similar institutions not only enhances the
top-down nature of decision-making structures in Central
Asian nations but also reduces the burdens of the state
by relieving the national government of certain social re-
sponsibilities under the pretext that social protections
should be provided through local community initiatives.
Thus, governments may claim to provide social protections
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protections. According to researcherswho have contributed
to this stream of research, another goal of governmental
policies regarding mahallas and similar communities is to
rebuff international criticism regarding the undemocratic
nature of the state structures and decision-making pro-
cedures in Central Asian countries.
Although both of the aforementioned approaches to the
understanding of mahallas shed light on certain aspects of
the existence and function of these local communities,
neither of these two perspectives completely elucidates the
nature of the relationship involving mahallas, their resi-
dents and the state. In particular, both perspectives polarise
the role of mahallas by placing these communities into a
binary structure in which they are considered either vic-
tims or agents of state policy. The current study suggests
that both of these approaches to understanding the place
and the role of local communities, particularly Uzbek
mahallas, in Central Asian states represent extreme in-
terpretations that are incomplete and require additional
clariﬁcation.
To address this issue, this study explains the place, role
and relationship between Uzbek mahallas and the state in
both Soviet and post-Soviet contexts in terms of the para-
digm suggested by Shlapentokh (Shlapentokh, 1985, 1989,
1999) to describe the essential nature of Soviet-era in-
stitutions. This investigation further develops this frame-
work to argue that Shlapentokh’s depiction of the Soviet-
era relationship between the state and society can also be
applied to the relationship between the mahalla and the
state in both Soviet and post-Soviet settings.
According to Shlapentokh’s deﬁnition, the activities of
an individual in the Soviet context can be divided into the
state (the activities of individuals within state-controlled
institutions), civil society (the legal activities of in-
dividuals outside of their small primary groups, which
involve the creation of organisations, such as mahallas or
other local communities), primary groups (such as families,
for instance) and individual spheres. Furthermore, this
paradigm groups the activities in these sectors as either
legal or illegal. Shlapentokh’s assumptionwas that although
civil society groups were not a structural component of the
Soviet system of governance, they were often called upon if
certain government-sponsored actions were necessary.
However, according to this paradigm, the Soviet state failed
to motivate and reward individuals’ legal achievements,
resulting in a gap between state expectations and actual
performance. In addition, there was a gradual shift in the
preferences of the populace towards the use of illegal in-
struments instead of legal instruments for their tasks
because the former actions proved to be more rewarding
than the latter. As a result, “the withdrawal of human en-
ergy and emotion from work for the state and the absorp-
tion of people in their private interests and the desire to
improve their life by illegal means has led to stagnation.”
(Shlapentokh, 1989, p. 13). At the same time, Shlapentokh
emphasises that such a system also produced pragmatic
individuals (with two-level Soviet perspectives) who “have
developed [a] mentality that allows them to ignore public
interests and to absorb themselves in private or illegal
activity in their workplace while preserving a surfaceallegiance to the Soviet system” (Shlapentokh, 1989, p. 13;
Shlapentokh, 1985, pp. 443–459).
By developing Shlapentokh’s ideas and applying these
concepts to the Central Asian context, the present study
seeks to explain the changing relationship between a state
and its populace during Soviet times; in particular, this
investigation approaches this topic by examining recollec-
tions that have been gathered regarding everyday experi-
ences related to community life in Soviet Uzbekistan
between the 1950s and the 1980s. In addition, although this
changing pattern of relationships between the public and
private spheres largely relates to the Soviet era, this paper
argues that these relationships have also inﬂuenced re-
spondents’ attitudes towards their post-independence
communal lives, which they describe in the narrations
that appear in each section of this paper.
To a great extent, the Soviet practice of utilising in-
stitutions of civil society for the purposes of the state has
been retained in post-Soviet times. Thus, as demonstrated
by the responses of the participants to the survey of this
study, the impact of this practice in the post-Soviet envi-
ronment is similar to its role during the Soviet era. The so-
cietal structure described by Shlapentokh with respect to
Soviet society can also be related to the case of Uzbekistan.
In this structure, the mahalla is placed among other civil
society institutions that areoften coercedbystate structures
to perform functions and duties that do not necessarily
serve the interests of community members but, instead,
facilitate the task of administrating residential issues for
governmental institutions. In this sense, although the
mahalla remains a structure of civil society, its relationship
to state institutions is signiﬁcant. This phenomenon has
resulted in a change in the attitude of the Uzbek populace
towards both state structures and their communities.
This change in the attitude of individuals towards their
communities is traced through ordinary citizens’ recollec-
tions of the Soviet mahalla and comparisons to the current
post-Soviet mahalla. In addressing these recollections, this
study adheres to the perspective that notions of memory
and identity are constantly changing. This change is inﬂu-
enced by contemporary developments, which create an
environment in which both memories and identities are
negotiated and contested. In this sense, the study of the
mahalla provides an excellent setting to observe how cur-
rent developments shape individuals’ attitudes towards the
past and towards their communities.
1.2. The notion of the mahalla and its signiﬁcance in
Uzbekistan
The mahalla refers to a residential quarter of a city,
which typically formed a community and self-governing
administrative unit of residents that exercised signiﬁcant
inﬂuence in Uzbekistan during the pre-Soviet, Soviet and
post-Soviet periods. Historically, each mahalla was
managed by a group of recognised elders who were
referred to as aksakals (which literally translates as “white
beards”). Interestingly, prior to the current system inwhich
aksakals are appointed, these individuals were chosen to
lead their communities on an unofﬁcial basis andwere only
later recognised by an executive authority or governmental
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dence, the mahallas were institutionalised; thus, leaders of
mahallas are typically elected by their communities but
must then be ofﬁcially approved/appointed as the leaders
of their mahallas by city ofﬁcials. Prior to the Soviet era and
the establishment of modern Central Asian republics, the
role of an elder included various functions, such as the
collection of taxes, the conveyance of orders, the mainte-
nance of security, the arbitration of disputes between res-
idents and the guardianship of orphans and widows.
However, under the auspices of Soviet governance, the
mahalla’s functions were decreased; in particular, the
mahalla primarily provided mutual support among com-
munity members and was responsible for supporting the
initiatives of the Soviet government. The post-Soviet
transformation of the mahalla gradually expanded the
role of mahallas and transformed these communities from
unofﬁcial and voluntary associations of residents into ofﬁ-
cial administrative units of a city.
Although the process of the institutionalisation of
mahallas in the post-Soviet environment is discussed in the
sections below, “unofﬁcial” mahallas commonly included
an informal network of residents who engaged in infor-
mation sharing and a voluntary mutual support system
(Dadabaev, 2012). In this sense, mahallas were historically
primarily a unit of identity that served as a basis for
effective self-governance. In contrast to modern-day
mahallas, which consist of more than 500 households,
traditional residential quarters and communities typically
consisted of many fewer households; no particular criteria
existed to deﬁne a particular set of households as a single
mahalla. The compact nature of the residential quarters of
traditional mahallas facilitated the task of maintaining
close contacts among community members and allowed
information to be exchanged within a community in a
relatively easy and rapid manner. Additionally, as a result of
the existence of various traditions and unofﬁcial social
engagements in a mahalla, mahalla-based associations
have proven to be much stronger than any alternative
attachments (such as socialist organisations, comrade
councils or similar structures) that were intentionally
introduced into the Uzbek society by various governmental
initiatives over various time periods. The concepts of “gap”
(“gashtak”), “guzar” and “chaikhona” are elements of the
mahalla that relate to engagements and shared spaces for
information exchange and communication among mahalla
residents.
For instance, “gap” is an Uzbek term that represents
“word” or “talking”. In the context of mahallas, “gap” refers
to the unofﬁcial associations among small groups of
mahalla residents who would visit each others’ homes and
engage in small talk over the course of dinners together. In
most situations, “gap” applied separately to men and
women. Each of these groups had a leader or an organiser;
different terms are used to refer this individual in various
locations, but this person was often referred to as the jo’ra
boshi. The costs of “gap” were either rotated among the
members of a group, with each member of the “gap” being
responsible for the costs of one meeting each year, or
shared by participants at the end of each meeting through
donations to the meeting’s convener. In Soviet and post-Soviet times, the total monetary contributions from the
participants in a meeting typically exceeded the total cost
of the dinner that was prepared by the meeting’s convener;
this phenomenon contributed to participants’ motivations
for participating in and hosting these meetings. However,
money has never been a primary motivating factor for the
meetings in question; instead, social networkingwithin the
area near one’s residence has always been a much higher
priority than any potential ﬁnancial gain with respect to
“gap” (Rakhimov, 1989, pp. 28–29).
In addition to social networking through “gap”, there
were other ways inwhich residents could meet to form and
share a common identity. For example, “guzar” refers to a
meeting space that existed in each resident community as a
place to exchange information and strengthen relation-
ships among individuals. Historically, the “guzar” featured
a high concentration of services, such as shopping, that
were provided to the residents of a mahalla small markets
were important aspects of “guzars”; in these markets, in-
dividuals were able to acquire all of their daily necessities
without needing to visit large bazaars. In addition, “guzars”
typically included small squares in which individuals could
gather, engage in small talk and share their news. “Chai-
khonas” (teahouses), which were typically constructed in
the centres of mahallas, were often part of these “guzars”
that served as venues for not only information exchanges
but also the formation of shared communal visions and
values. Frequently, “gaps” and other mahalla-related ac-
tivities occurred in “chaikhonas” (Makhallada Tarbiia,
1970).
Mahallas included not only information exchanges and
the strengthening of communal identities but also certain
traditional structures that were used as methods for
ensuring mutual support among community members.
One of these structures was “khashar”. “Khashar” refers to
voluntary mutual support that residents of a community
provided to each other to allow community members to
maintain their livelihoods. A typical example of “khashar”
involved receiving assistance from neighbours if an indi-
vidual was rebuilding an old house or building a new
house. In these situations, residents of the same mahalla
would voluntarily gather, primarily on weekends, to help
with the on-going construction of this house. The in-
dividuals who received this help were thenmorally obliged
to assist any other residents of the same mahalla who
would build a new home in the future.
2. Recollections of mahalla community in the Soviet
system of administration
2.1. Authorities and the mahalla
To an extent, the Soviet policy towards the mahalla was
consistent with a colonial pattern of administration in
which a colonising power maintains any indigenous struc-
tures that can serve its interests and help consolidate its
power (Kulchik, Fadin, & Sagdeev, 1996, p. 10). Prior to the
Soviet era, mahallas generally maintained a certain degree
of independence from formal rulers, although these rulers
relied on mahallas for the aforementioned functions. The
Soviet policy towards mahallas, particularly during the
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pronged approach of the Soviet government towards
various traditional institutions in this region. This govern-
ment mobilised Soviet sympathisers to actively utilise
mahalla structures to advocate for changes in traditional
lifestyles that were represented by the Soviet administra-
tion (Abramson, 1998, p. 61). This policy was launched in
1922 through a recommendation memo that was sent from
the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) of
Turkestan to the executive committee and the revolutionary
committee (revolyutsion ko’mita) of this region; this memo
urged the use of the mahalla residents’ committee of every
district for the purposes of agitation (Abramson,1998, p. 72).
In particular, the chaihana teahouses that already exis-
ted in each quarter were supposed to transform into “red
chaihana” that could deepen local residents’ understanding
of the purposes of the Soviet administration. In each of
these “red” chaihanas, reading corners consisting of mag-
azines, books and posters in various scripts and languages
were to be created.
Moreover, in 1924, the Communist Party appealed to
“menwith a strong sense of responsibility” to join the “gap”
and engage in political discussions (Abramson, 1998, p. 71).
Not surprisingly, discourses about the beneﬁts of socialism
were intended to dominate these discussions. The Soviet
administration also established a “women’s group” in each
mahalla at this time and positioned these groups as orga-
nisations that sought to resolve women’s issues in resi-
dential quarters. In 1932, legislation regarding the mahalla
committees in the urban areas of Uzbekistan was adopted
(G’ulomov, 2003, p. 31). This legislation eased the severity
of the governmental stance with respect to mahallas; by
1938, the mahallas were granted a degree of freedom to
fulﬁl social roles (G’ulomov, 2003, p. 31).
After a number of years, additional powers were
ostensibly transferred to the mahalla during the historical
re-evaluation that began with the campaign of General
Secretary Khrushchev of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) in 1959 (Abramson, 1998, p. 72).1 Although
the supreme council of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic
established a law in 1961 that deﬁned the functions of the
“mahalla committees”, this law provided only for limited
social roles for these committees.
Tomanage andmaintain a certain degree of control over
each residential quarter, the Soviet administration estab-
lished a Soviet assembly and an executive committee in
each city district to execute the state’s resolutions. The
mahalla were placed under the jurisdiction of these exec-
utive committees. A mahalla representative committee was
established that was subordinate to the executive com-
mittee, a governmental agency, and each mahalla repre-
sentative reported to this governmental agency once or
twice each month to receive instructions. These mahalla
representative committees existed on both the city level
and the district level. The original purpose of these com-
mittees was presumably to open a channel of dialogue1 Both a 1959 speech by Khrushchev at the 11th Congress of the
Communist Party of the USSR and the CPSU programme in 1961 referred
to communities similar to the mahalla as units of “local self-governance”.between mahalla representatives and Soviet authorities;
however, in practice, the mahalla committee simply served
as a setting in which the Soviet administration could give
instruction to the mahalla representatives.2 In each district,
the formation and approval of a mahalla was determined
by an executive committee, a governmental agency, and the
existence of a mahalla was not recognised in the absence of
this committee’s approval (Kamilov, 1961, pp. 59–60). In
contrast to the 10,000 mahallas that currently exist in
Uzbekistan, the data on the number of mahallas in certain
cities in 1961 indicate that there were 270 or more in
Tashkent,131 in Samarkand, 48 in Kokand (Kotler,1961, 33),
45 in Nukus, 42 in Namangan and 41 in Andijan (Kamilov,
1961, pp. 59–60) (Fig. 1).
Although the structure that is depicted in the above
ﬁgure ofﬁcially existed, the membership in various sub-
units of the mahalla committee was ambiguous and
largely voluntary. The activities of the mahalla of this
period were performed voluntarily, and participation was
not obligatory among mahalla residents. The activities of
the mahalla committee organisations were primarily
related to culture, sports and improvements in the living
environment the districts. Only organisations such as the
“neighbourhood watch” and “comrade courts” closely
cooperated with governmental agencies, and both of these
organisations received instructions from the police, the
public prosecutor’s ofﬁce and the courts.2.2. Ideological limitations and recollections of communal life
As stated above, the Soviet administration limited the
social role of mahallas and used mahallas for its own pur-
poses. However, because mahallas enjoyed high levels of
public support, the Soviet administration believed that the
abolishment of the mahalla structure would be impractical.
Instead, authorities used mahallas to spread anti-religious
propaganda, advertise socialistic events and lifestyles
and support the national activities of the Soviet Union
(Umarkhodzhaeva, 1987, p. 26).
Over various time periods, the Soviet authorities
argued that mahallas provided an advantageous method
of spreading information related to the Soviet adminis-
tration among residents and effectively executing
various policies in each residential district. Most impor-
tantly, mahallas could facilitate the spread and control of
the awareness and perception of residents regarding
ideological initiatives and undertakings (“Polozhenie o
makhallinskikh (kvartal’nykh) komitetakh.”, 1932, p.
113; “Polozhenie ob Obschikh Sobraniyakh.”, 1963, pp.
182–194; Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta
Uzbekskoi SSR, 1983; “Polozhenie o Makhallinskikh
komitetakh Tashkenta”, 1990, p. 2).
The Soviet authorities also positioned mahalla struc-
tures as institutions that could monitor the processes that2 For additional information regarding the relationships between 302
mahalla communities of Tashkent and the state institutions of the Soviet
era, see “Makhallinskie komitety Tashkenta: Tsyfry i fakty”, Agitator
Uzbekistana, N. 7, 1990, str.22–25.
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Administrative Executive 
Committee 
(ijiroi komiteti) 
Instruction Mahalla Representative 
General Assembly 
(oq-soqollar kengashi) 
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(oq-soqollar kengashi) 
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Improvement 
Group 
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(sanitariya)
Etiquette 
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Comrade 
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(ayollar aktivi) 
 Dispute 
Arbitration 
Group 
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Fig. 1. The Structure of a mahalla committee during the 1970s (example from mahalla “Oktyabr 40 Yilligi”).
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dents.3 In certain cases, the purpose of this strict control
was not only to assess whether mahalla residents were
spreading anti-Soviet propaganda but also to determine
whether each household paid taxes on the crops and live-
stock in its yard during the early stages of the Soviet
regime. This usage of the mahalla by the state effectively
reversed the impressions that mahallas conveyed. In
particular, as described below, instead of contributing to
the inclusiveness of the neighbourhood community,
mahalla activities began to be regarded with certain degree
of fear.
All of the people in the mahalla felt fear during the
Soviet period. Of course, nothing would go well under
such conditions.
For example, all of the mahallas were ordered to plant
trees, so our mahalla planted trees as well. However,
because the trees were provided by the government,
nobody tried to eat the fruit even though the fruit was
ripe. This is because the trees belonged to the country,
and if the people ate the fruit, they would be considered
a thief. Even if it became a situation where nobody
owned trees in the mahalla, the government continued
to require compulsory tree planting (Respondent No. 1,
Uzbek, Male, Tashkent).3 According to the regulations of 1961, ﬁnancial operations and
entrepreneurial activities by mahalla communities were prohibited.
These activities and their governance were governed by the rules and
regulations of the executive Soviets (which were institutions of the ex-
ecutive branch of power). In addition, each general meeting of a mahalla
committee was to be attended by the head of the executive Soviet of the
district to which the mahalla in question belonged (“Polozhenie ob
Obschikh Sobraniyakh (Skhodakh) Grazhdan v Sel’skikh Mestnostyakh
Uzbekskoi SSR Utverzhdeno Ukazom Prezidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta
Uzbekskoi SSR, 30 avgusta 1961”, Spravochnik Aktivista-Obschestvennika:
Sbornik ustavov I polozhenii samodeiatel’nykh organizatsii trudyaschikhsya,
Tashkent, 1963, str.188–191).The mahalla and similar community organisations
functioned as semi-formal structures for public mobi-
lisation. In certain remote locations where other Soviet
organizations did not function, these organisations per-
formed important resident registration functions when
individuals died, babies were born and people moved from
one area to another. For instance, if babies were born in
districts far from urban areas or the Soviet (the council), the
mahalla or Jamoa (a type of local community similar to the
mahalla) issued the birth certiﬁcate. The impacts of domi-
nant Soviet ideologies and governmental instructions were
evident in the work of mahalla committee activists, as
described in the anecdote below.
My younger brother was born in 1945, and my parents
and grandmother wanted to name him Turubqosim. My
grandmother came up with this name wishing that he
would stand up on his own feet and start walking soon,
and my parents agreed with this name.
On the 9th day after he was born, when my grand-
mother went to the Jamoa to register his name and get a
certiﬁcate of birth (which was called the metrika), she
could not use the name Turubqosim. A female clerical
worker of the Jamoa determined that something was
wrong with the meaning of the name, and she said,
“Grandma, you are a well-educated person, why do you
want to give your grandson such a name?” She sug-
gested another name, saying “how about Anvar or
Avaz?” In the end, my brother was named Avaz
(Respondent No. 16, Uzbek, Female, Tashkent).
Interestingly, the Soviet administration did not limit its
attempted changes to the private lives of members of
mahallas and similar communities to general propaganda
campaigns but, instead, provided speciﬁc and detailed
suggestions, such as preferred names for newly born ba-
bies; in fact, the administration believed that these sug-
gested names were “appropriate” for socialist lifestyles and
issued certain guidelines to promote the use of these names
(“Sotsialisticheskie Obriady”, 1987, p. 14).
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applied signiﬁcant ideological pressure on the mahallas to
induce these organisations to act in accordance with the
core policies of the state, the Soviet system of governance
did not attribute a great deal of importance to the mahalla
institution and therefore provided little ﬁnancial support
to mahallas. The Soviet governance system attempted to
shift power from religious and traditional authorities to the
Soviets (councils) and executive committees in each dis-
trict. Thus, under Soviet rule, mahallas maintained a very
low proﬁle, and their activities in each district were
voluntarily sustained by the enthusiasm of residents who
were willing to participate in these communities. In this
sense, Soviet-era mahallas largely represented an informal
human network of information exchange and mutual
support that was based on moral and religious values;
historically, these values were inherited in various resident
communities, particularly in the older portions of Uzbek
cities.
3. Nostalgia about Soviet-era community
3.1. Communication, information exchange and mutual
support among mahalla residents
As discussed by many interview respondents, because
mahallas were not provided with formal roles and au-
thority by the Soviet government, Soviet-era mahalla ac-
tivists were primarily engaged in the traditional mahalla
functions of information exchange, communication, the
organisation of interactions among neighbours and the
mobilisation of residents for various voluntary events.
Mahallas also served as a unifying factor for developing
common perspectives and concerns among the residents
of the same community and, therefore, fulﬁlled the
important function of building one’s identity as a local
resident.
The residents of a mahalla were the individuals
who voluntarily sustained their community’s structure;
mahalla residents were not forced to participate in the
organisation of communal events. In various ways, infor-
mation regarding these events was always provided to
everyone who lived in a mahalla (Rakhimov, 1989, pp. 28–
29). For instance, residents who hosted events would visit
each home in a community to convey this information;
alternatively, neighbours and elders could convey this in-
formation to criers who loudly announced news to resi-
dents on the day of an event. The latter system of spreading
informationwas particularly prevalent in rural areas during
the Soviet era; for instance, one respondent recalled these
types of events as follows.
Weddings during the period of the Soviet Union were
also held on a grand scale. From approximately 4:00 in
the morning, a man riding a horse would ride around
the mahalla announcing that there would be a wedding
today in a particular house and that fried rice (pilaf)
would be served. Everybody went to that house
(Respondent No. 32, Uzbek, Male, Andijan).
In addition to engaging in information exchange and the
strengthening of identities, mahallas also utilised certaintraditional structures for mutual support among commu-
nity residents.
Residents of Uzbekistan typically recall having a degree
of economic leeway and relatively stable livelihoods during
the Soviet era; in particular, the scale of mahalla events was
very large, and these events could not be conducted
smoothly by a family without the help of neighbours.
The mahalla achieved its function very well. For
example, when awedding was held at someone’s home,
everyone rushed to help. The scale of the banquets was
very large; for example, approximately 100 kg of rice
was used to make the pilaf. The use of that much rice
meant that 1000 people would be invited to a banquet
(the general guide for a pilaf is approximately 100 g per
person). It was impossible for one family to prepare food
for 1000 people, and it was still not possible even if all of
the family’s relatives came to help (to complete all of the
work). The help of the mahalla is essential. (Respondent
No. 32, Uzbek, Male, Andijan).
The following recollection, which refers to the practice
of mutual help among mahalla residents, compares
mahallas during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods and
emphasises the differences in residents’ attitudes towards
each other during these two periods.
The existence of elders was essential for the mahalla in
those [Soviet] days. There were many elders, and their
presence was important.
When someonewas having difﬁculty, all of the residents
paid some money to help the troubled people. The
amount of money was not determined, and whatever
each family could pay was acceptable; families that did
not have money would voluntarily offer any type of
support that they could provide.
In today’s mahalla, nobody cares about anybody, even
though there are people who are having difﬁculty. It is
regrettable that people assume nothing is wrong with
modern society. (Respondent No. 9, Uzbek, Male,
Tashkent).3.2. Human relations in the mahalla during the Soviet era
Many respondentswho responded to this survey recalled
not only the communicative and informative functions but
also the human-relations aspects of the Soviet-era mahalla.
These respondents expressed positive recollections of these
human-relation functions and lamented the way in which
these values have changed in recent times. In the eyes of
these individuals, the informal mahalla that existed during
the Soviet era functioned smoothly. These respondents feel
that the very fact that they survived the Soviet regime,
which posed severe challenges for the mahalla, was a
reﬂection of the positive human relations and mutual
compassion that marked the Soviet-era mahalla.
To some extent, a mahalla offered a venue for its resi-
dents to preserve their sense that they belonged to their
community during a time when Soviet authorities
attempted to eradicate all of the associations of Soviet cit-
izens with the exception of their sense of a Soviet identity.
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paper emphasised that the mahalla’s role as a safeguard of
community values and human relations weakened after
the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In the mahalla of the past, there was mutual empathy
and sincerity. People shared their belongings in their
daily lifestyles. Today, while there are plenty of pos-
sessions, I believe we have lost empathy and sincerity.
In the old days, community events would be occasions
for staying over at other’s homes for three days or more,
with everyone bringing food, sitting around, talking and
celebrating. Today, that’s no longer the case. It is rather
sad, because although we live in a calmer and more
tranquil era, the compassion no longer exists (Respon-
dent No. 40, Uzbek male from Fergana Province).
Another respondent explains this situation by reasoning
that the very essence of mahalla communities has changed
since Soviet times. Although membership in mahallas was
based on their residential status, certain respondents felt
that mahallas helped to create an identity that was more
similar to a family relationship than to neighbourhood in-
teractions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, mahalla
residents ceased experiencing ideological pressure from
the state to relinquish their residential mahalla identities.
This phenomenon led to a decrease in the importance of
mahallas as safeguards against ideological pressures.
Another factor that has inﬂuenced residents’ attitudes to-
wards their communities is that people felt less attached to
the notion of public goods during the Soviet era because
community activities were not welcomed and rewarded at
that time. This detachment resulted in the gradual weak-
ening of attachments towards communal lives that has
occurred in the post-Soviet context.
Neighbours would visit each other’s homes and
frequently stay overnight. In a certain sense, this was
the distinguishing trait of our mahalla. This occurrence
reﬂected the history of our mahalla, which stretched far
back in time and included strong traditions and ties
forged between people. From what I have heard, when
the mahalla were ﬁrst established, there was still no
running water or electricity. Everything was built up
through the efforts of the residents themselves.
The mahalla of those days were supported by family-
like bonds between residents. Events or incidents at
other residents’ homes were equivalent to one’s own
affairs, leading to the attitude, for example, that
participating in a neighbour’s wedding ceremony was
the same as experiencing one’s ownwedding. The depth
of the compassion that existed back then is incompa-
rable to the state of the mahalla today.
After the end of Soviet rule, I moved to an apartment-like
home in another district, and I nowknowvery little about
the mahalla in this new area. To this day, though, when I
return to the region of my family home, the people of the
neighbourhood drop by to say hello, and I often visit their
homes to pay my respects to the elders of the mahalla
(Respondent No. 32, Uzbek male from Andijan).Similarly, another respondent emphasised that mahallas
in the Soviet times were in a position between the public
and private interest and that the borders between these two
spheres were not clearly deﬁned. In the relationships be-
tween Uzbeks and the government, the mahalla community
wasmore associatedwith the private interests of individuals
because the community of the Soviet days involved bonds
that were similar to extended family relationships.
The residents of amahallaweremoremodest during the
Soviet era than they are now; during Soviet times, no
one in the neighbourhood was looked upon as an
outsider. Everyonewas like your own relative. The doors
of all homes were always left open, with no one both-
ering to lock up. Frequently, if not every day, mahalla
dwellers would visit each other’s homes to gather
together and drink tea. Although there were limits to
what each home was able to serve, people would share
whatever they had. We would pass enjoyable time
together while munching on what was served.
Everyone was kind and friendly, and when someone was
ill we would drop by to ask how that person was doing.
This extended to basic education as well. If kids did
something bad, neighbourhood residents would scold
these kids as if they were the residents’ own children.
Weddingswereoccasions foreveryonetopitch inandhelp
becauseweall consideredourneighbours tobe like family.
In today’s mahalla, everyone is totally preoccupied with
his own affairs and has no occasion to try and help
anyone else. This issue holds true for me as well, and
recently, I have had no one to open up to even if I’m
having trouble. I usually just fret by myself (Respondent
No. 26, Tartar female from Namangan).
The majority of the respondents in this study emphas-
ised the human relations that were the focus and the
driving force of the mahalla during the Soviet era. In the
eyes of these respondents, these human relations consti-
tute the largest difference between the mahalla of the So-
viet age and the modern mahalla, and there are aspects of
the Soviet-era mahalla that these respondents continue to
value extremely highly. This nostalgia stems from the fact
that neighbourhood relationships during the Soviet era
closely resembled the relationships that exist among blood
relatives. These ties were characterised by a natural sense
of closeness and mutual compassion among residents of a
mahalla; in particular, persons from several different gen-
erations lived together in the same district and knew each
other extraordinarily well. For situations in which new in-
dividuals moved into these districts, the newcomers would
work extremely hard to establish positive ties with their
neighbourhoods. The resulting combination of well-
established residents and new residents made it possible
for the Soviet-era mahalla communities to sustain a bal-
ance between the traditional and the contemporary.
3.3. Mahallas as venues for traditional education in the
Soviet era
Soviet-era mahallas traditionally provided a renowned
education; this characteristic has been regarded as a factor
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mahalla and the adults who these children became. This
education did not involve any one-sided requirements to
adopt the values of a mahalla. Instead, it was taught that
the values of the mahalla serve to uphold morals and
livelihoods and that these morals act to not only unify the
mahalla but also forge the self-awareness and identity of a
mahalla’s children as residents of their community.
Education that was unique to a mahalla was provided
within each neighbourhood, whereas ofﬁcial Soviet-style
education was taught at formal schools. Interestingly,
many of the educators from these schools lived in mahalla
communities. After returning to their own mahallas, these
individuals became educators who taught traditional
values, emphasising the importance of appropriate atti-
tudes towards work, respect for the elderly, the funda-
mental aspects of sound neighbourhood relationships and
various other traits. Many of these types of scenes remain
deeply rooted in the memories of respondents in this
study.
Above all else, teachers were truly a commanding
presence at the mahalla. When I saw a teacher
approaching from afar, I would typically hide behind our
house door or a tree out of a combination of respect and
fear. Teachers were truly overwhelming.
One time I ran into a teacher at someone’s wedding and
felt so tense that I couldn’tmanage to act properly.When I
saw the teacher the next day at school, the teacher scol-
ded me: ‘I saw you yesterday, and I can only say that you
need to gohomeand studyas soonas you’re donehelping
out with a wedding ceremony. Or are you thinking of
getting married yourself?’ Teachers would sometimes
strike students if it proved necessary, but I now regard
this form of punishment as a blessing in disguise
(Respondent No. 13, Uzbek female from Tashkent).
Teachers were profoundly respected within a mahalla
because they were positively regarded as individuals who
raised the status of a mahalla and worked hard to improve
the morals of local children. Another respondent recalled
the atmosphere at a mahalla that included a number of
educators.
With many educators living at our mahalla, we students
were literally afraid to walk the streets. For example,
when we would be cleaning up the mahalla or the area
in front of our own homes, a teacher would always be
watching from somewhere. If we didn’t do the job
neatly, we would be cautioned about it later on. In
addition, we would naturally properly greet our teach-
ers when coming to school or going home.
Because ours was a mahalla with so many teachers, we
always seemed to be planting trees or carrying out other
communal work. When someone was getting married,
we would all participate in the preparation as a natural
matter of course. When preparing sumalyak (a dish
cooked up in huge pots for the spring-New Year coming
festival) or other foods, the entire mahalla would turn
out for this preparatorywork (Respondent No. 27, Uzbek
female from Namangan).In the selective memory of our respondents, all resi-
dents of a mahalla were not required to adopt the same
behaviours, but there were clear rules regarding actions
that were absolutely forbidden. These residents were ex-
pected to have attitudes, manners of speech and dress and
other practices that were included within this framework.
Behaviour that exceeded the permitted scope would likely
earn criticism and admonishment from neighbourhood
elders, senior citizens and others respected individuals.
However, as remembered by many, this system also
represented certain degree of social pressure on residents
which often predetermined their actions. According to one
recollection, members of almost all of the families in the
mahalla were mobilised and sent to ﬁght in World War II,
whereas no one from the respondent’s family had left the
community to serve in this war. The shame of this situation
caused a member of the respondent’s family to reportedly
volunteer for military service.
My uncle said that he felt disgraced because nobody
from his family was ﬁghting in the war, despite the fact
that other families all had someone in the military. This
situation induced him to volunteer for the navy, and he
went off to war and eventually returned safely
(Respondent No. 20, Tajik male from Samarkand).
These dynamics were also a contributing factor that
may have explained residents’ recollections that the Soviet-
era mahallas involved an attitude in which everyone
contribute to equally sharing burdens and resolving prob-
lems to the greatest possible extent.
The same unwritten rules also applied to the dress code
that was considered appropriate for public appearances, as
described in the narration below.
We had not been living in the mahalla all that long. A
major difference between our family and the traditional
mahalla residents was our clothing. My father returned
from Germany, where he had been stationed with a
Soviet military unit, and he began to live in our mahalla.
When he went outside for recreation, he often wore the
same clothing that he had grown accustomed to in
Germany.
One day my father ventured outside our home wearing
a pair of shorts. This appearance was apparently quite
shocking to the residents of ourmahalla. Clearly, none of
them had ever worn shorts in their lives (Respondent
No. 30, Russian female from Andijan).
From the perspective of those preferring not to exten-
sively engage with community, the morals of the mahalla
infringed on personal rights. Some people limited their
interactions with themahalla and instead lived on the basis
of their own personal beliefs in a way that did not pose
problems for the neighbourhood. The mahalla itself also
recognized the presence of these individuals and did not
seem to force them to comply with local morals.3.4. The mahalla and ethnic fusion
There have been historical differences in the standards
used to form mahallas. Certain mahallas were created
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in the same district,whereas otherswere formed bypersons
of the sameethnic backgroundwho chose to live in the same
region. However, with the advent of Soviet rule, these types
of clear-cut divisions between individualmahallas faded to a
considerable degree, and almost all mahallas becamemulti-
ethnic communities. The only feature that was retained by
these communities from pre-Soviet times was certain
names that referred to the ethnicities of mahalla residents
and/or the occupations of the individuals who had previ-
ously resided in those communities.
Interestingly, as described below, the importance of the
educational and cultural facets of mahallas that were
emphasised in the section above appealed not only to Uz-
beks and other Central Asian ethnic groups but also to
Russians and non-Central Asians.
Above all else, I believe that the strength of the mahalla
lies in the education provided there. Given that it is
quite difﬁcult to cultivate respect for one’s elders,
mutual compassion and other key values these days, I
am totally in favour of teaching such lessons in the
home and at the mahalla level from the time that chil-
dren are small. Even today, young people frommahallas
will give up their seats when I ride on the subway or the
bus.
When I was young, I once travelled to Russia. When I
boarded a bus, I saw senior citizens standing up, while
young people remained seated as if nothing was out of
the ordinary. When I told those young people sitting
down to yield their seats to elderly riders, everyone in
the bus looked at me like I was their sworn enemy. I
announced that I personally lived in Uzbekistan, where
this type of situation would be inconceivable. However,
even so, no one offered to get up. I am proud of the
mahalla for providing such a solid educational back-
ground, and feel that the educational contributions
these community units make are quite signiﬁcant
(Respondent No. 29, Russian female from Kokand).
Another Russian respondent also stressed the hospital-
ity between neighbours in a mahalla and stated that this
generosity steadily expanded beyond the Uzbeks to impact
the morals and values of other peoples as well. The mes-
sage from this respondent is that mahalla values are not
limited to the Uzbek ethnicity but, rather, contain compo-
nents that can be shared with other ethnic groups.
From the beginning, I felt that the mahalla was the true
heart of the Uzbek people and the origin fromwhich the
Uzbeks derived their distinguishing traits. When
someone comes to your home, they are always served
some type of food, given tea to drink and greeted and
encouraged with gracious words. I found this to be a
wonderful national trait.
Many Russians like myself have lived in Uzbekistan for
many years, andwehave come to feelmore in common in
terms of customs and thinking with the Uzbek people
than with Russians who reside in Russia. Because Rus-
sians like us have incorporated much of the thinking,
actions and other aspects of the local Uzbek people intoour ownhearts, although I amaRussian, I have absolutely
no regrets about accepting the values of the mahalla.
There is great beauty in those values (Respondent No. 31,
Russian female from Andijan).
For situations in which the mahallas were predomi-
nantly Uzbek but incorporated considerable representation
of other ethnic groups, these mahallas typically created a
cosmopolitan culture of inclusiveness that has frequently
been maintained to the present day. This type of multi-
ethnic makeup constituted no threat to the integration of
mahalla residents and was often the subject of pride and
positive participation in the mahalla. Furthermore, some
believe that the multi-ethnic Soviet-era mahallas
possessed a far stronger sense of unity than the present-
day mahallas, which are overwhelmingly composed of
Uzbeks. However, in the words of our respondents, this
phenomenon is largely related to the increasing gaps in the
well-being and quality of life among residents that has
followed the end of the Soviet era, and many residents,
particularly wealthier residents who are new arrivals to a
mahalla, do not display attachments to and relationships
with their communities.
When I was a child, I was always running around and
playing inside our mahalla. Uzbek and Russian kids
played together, and elderly folks would frequently
warn us kids to behave and so forth. The spirit of soli-
darity inside the mahalla was truly marvellous, but I’m
afraid to say that type of atmosphere is no longer around
today.
There has been an increase in the number of Uzbeks
who buy up homes vacated by Russians who return to
Russia and then build large (isolated by the walls)
palace-like houses on those sites. There is a tendency
among these Uzbeks to want to build homes that are
bigger and more luxurious than the others in the
neighbourhood. They aren’t interested in having re-
lationships with their neighbours but instead become
self-centred and isolated. As this suggests, major
changes have occurred in both human relationships and
the mahalla neighbourhoods (Respondent No. 9, Uzbek
male from Tashkent).
However, during the Soviet era, the majority of Russians
and others who preferred a “modernised” lifestyle chose to
live in “new” districts because the traditional mahallas
were often not fully connected to the gas, electric andwater
supply services. From the perspective of these residents
who wished to pursue modernised lifestyles, the mahalla
were difﬁcult to understand and had no real connections to
their own lives.
In the new urban district where I lived, there was little
familiarity with the term ‘mahalla’. Back in those days,
Tashkent was divided between the old part of town
occupied by Muslims and the new urban district, where
Europeans lived.
Though the mahalla term might have had a meaning to
the Muslims, for us, this term had little impact. It is
possible that there was a mahalla committee in my
district, but if so, their activities were not very
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even aware of its existence. What’s more, because there
were not nearly as many people then who required
support for their livelihoods as there are today, there
was no need for the role played by amahalla committee.
Because of the differences between the Muslim district
and the new urban district regarding the methods used
for funerals and other activities, I imagine there were
dissimilarities between the two districts regarding
these activities. As we had no understanding of these
activities in the Muslim district, we didn’t become too
deeply involved. However, I gradually came to partici-
pate in funerals for Muslims; given the need for large
numbers of people to help at these times, I learned how
the Muslim residents came to each other’s aid. For
example, if there were funeral or wedding ceremonies
held in Muslimmahallas, it was normally impossible for
individual households to supply the chairs, desks and
other minimal items necessary for the event; thus, the
mahalla would collectively purchase this equipment to
be made available for use by all households at appro-
priate occasions.
In addition, there was no real need for the mahalla
committee to be strictly organised as a formal council.
Because everyone was aware of who the elders, senior
citizens other key people in the community were, they
would visit these individuals for consultations as the
need arose. Thus, for practical purposes, the term
‘mahalla committees’ actually referred to speciﬁc in-
dividuals (Respondent No. 21, Russian female from
Samarkand).4. The community after the collapse of the Soviet
state
4.1. Post-Soviet communal life
With the end of the Soviet Union and the dawning of the
era of perestroika, there was a steady trend towards re-
examining the functions of the mahalla and the values
that this neighbourhood structure embodied. As a result,
the mahallas began to return to society; the achievement of
Uzbekistan’s independence from the Soviet Union helped
to encourage this trend. In the post-Soviet era, mahallas
ﬁrst drew attention as venues for promoting ethnic and
Islamic values, and their resurrection was supported not
only by the Uzbek president and government but also by
the nationalistic intelligentsia. This support reﬂected the
notion that the mahalla itself was an expression of the
unique identity of the Uzbek culture and a tradition that
deserved to be protected, particularly after withstanding
the oppression of the Soviet era.
However, in time, instead of emphasising the fact that the
mahallawasa sociocultural traditionof theUzbekpeople, the
government of Uzbekistanbegan to emphasise the aspects of
these neighbourhoods that promoted inter-ethnic dialogue
and helped stabilise Uzbek society. The goal of this shift to-
wards a greater appreciation of the community structurewas
similar to the objectives of the Soviet government withrespect to mahallas. In the context of an independent Uzbe-
kistan, this goal involvedusing the traditionalmechanismsof
the mahalla for tasks that the government considered to be
important, such as addressing and stabilising issues that
arose immediately after the establishment of Uzbekistan’s
independence, including the tensions that existed between
different ethnic groups, declines in standards of living, dis-
satisfactions and anxiety in the society. To achieve this
objective, the government re-organised the mahallas, which
had always been unofﬁcial communities, into semi-ofﬁcial
steering committees with established budgets, personnel
and duties (Jamoat tashkilotlari to’g’risida O’zbekiston
Prezidentining farmonlari va Vazirlar Mahkamasini
qarorlari, 1998; Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan
I.A.Karimova, 1998; Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan
I.A.Karimova, 1992; Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan ob
organakh samoupravleniya grazhdan, 1999). In addition,
the government sponsored the creation of the Mahalla
Philanthropic Foundation, which had the mission of serving
as an association of all mahalla committees and supporting
thework of these committees. Subsequently, the state of the
national economy of Uzbekistan and growing tension in the
political environment, most notably the rise of Islamic ex-
tremists, led to a steady increase in the duties ofmahallas. At
length, the mahalla transitioned from an unofﬁcial network
of neighbours to a “ofﬁcial” social unit of self-administration.
This shift in governmental attitudes towards mahallas
did not occur immediately but slowly evolved in several
stages. Immediately after Uzbekistan had obtained its in-
dependence, the government only charged mahalla orga-
nisations with the functions of safeguarding national values
and traditions. However, under conditions of increasing
issues and problems that the Uzbek government had to
address, government adopted a stance that involved uti-
lising the potential of mahalla communities to decrease
governmental costs, raise the efﬁciency of social support
initiatives and increase public order. Therefore, as an aspect
of constructing more ofﬁcial structures to supplant orga-
nisations that were previously unofﬁcial communities,
the government of Uzbekistan not only established com-
mittees to mobilise residents but also neighbourhood
watch (mahalla posbonlari) units that were called upon to
monitor their communities and report any irregularities
related to potential terrorist activity to state institutions.
The importance of these units rose after the ﬁrst terrorist
bombing of the capital of Uzbekistan, which occurred in
1999. The ﬁnal step towards “ofﬁcialising” mahalla com-
mittees involved transferring broad responsibilities for
resident registration, social assistance and social welfare to
these institutions, although the funds that were transferred
to mahalla committees for these tasks were frequently
insufﬁcient to complete the all of the tasks in question.
4.2. Shifting nature of mahalla identity: comparing Soviet and
post-Soviet mahallas
The introduction of this type of resident support
system in post-Soviet Uzbekistanwas based on the premise
that individuals who reside within the same mahalla
have greater understanding than government agencies
regarding the members of a district who are most in need
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bers may need. Another assumption of this system is that
the mahalla committees will act with greater sincerity than
government agencies with respect to administering this
necessary support to the residents of a district (for details
see Micklewright, Coudouel, & Marnie, 2001).
At present, however, the shift from unofﬁcial to ofﬁcial
status for the mahalla is not necessarily producing the
anticipated results. There are a number of reasons for this
trend. One notable issue that helps to explain this effect is
that although there are limited sources of revenue available
in the national budget to fund mahallas, there are a truly
boundless number of individuals who are in need of sup-
port. Another concern relates to the types of people who
serve on the mahalla committees that help to determine
how available funds are allocated. The mahallas, which
previously functioned asworking structures on anunofﬁcial
basis, are being made ofﬁcial and placed under the admin-
istrativewings of national government agencies. As a result,
attachments to these communities, which were already
weakened by the Soviet governments’ policies towards
mahallas, have further deteriorated. The mahalla has
become a residence-based unit of administration and is no
longer perceived as an aspect of the “private” sphere.
Increasingly, residents have shifted away from considering
mahallas to be “enlarged” family structures and towards
regarding mahallas as governmental institutions.
Before declaring that the present mahallas are good or
bad, let’s take a look at one practical example. There is an
elderly woman who lives on the ﬂoor beneath me. She
has a hard time making ends meet and lives in economic
distress. She has visited us (her neighbours) any number
of times to explain her situation and then return home.
We have done what we can to help (such as sharing our
food and clothing with her). However, we have rarely
seen any actions taken by themahalla committee to help
this lady out andmake her lifestyle even a little bit better
(Respondent from2005 survey, female,Uzbek, Tashkent).
Because of the large area that is included in each of the
ofﬁcial mahallas, the mahalla staffers are not limited to
individuals who reside in the same neighbourhood.
Moreover, these staffers frequently have administrative
responsibility for a wide range of districts. Because these
mahallas have been ofﬁcially recognised, they have effec-
tively become deﬁned as organisations that have been
subcontracted by governmental agencies. The individuals
who work on mahalla committees also differ from the
traditional mahalla elders; instead, many have described
these individuals as exuding a “staff-like presence”.
During the Soviet era, for the traditional mahalla elders
and the individuals who assisted them, the provision of
support to residents was not regarded as “work” but was
instead considered to be a traditional “mission”. By contrast,
the modern-day personnel of the ofﬁcial mahallas perceive
their responsibilities as little more than an ordinary job;
moreover, the salaries of these personnel are extremely low.
This perspective is evident from the following testimony.
To this day, I have tried to have few interactions with
mahallas, although I have gone to a mahalla once ortwice. My impression when visiting a mahalla is that
there are a tremendous number of things that need to
be done to make mahallas better. Naturally, the purpose
of mahalla activities is to improve people’s lives, such as
by providing assistance for fatherless families or low-
income households. As things stand now, however, if
people in need don’t go to the mahalla themselves and
plead that ‘I’m in extreme trouble, with my livelihood
becoming desperate’, the mahalla will take no action on
its own.
I have also heard that most of the staffers there operate
on the basis of money (bribes). People are often told to
bring in piles of certiﬁcation forms, and apparently it is
not unusual to pay money (bribes) to receive one of
those certiﬁcates (Respondent from 2005 survey, male,
Uzbek, Tashkent).
There are many different facets of the roles of modern
mahallas. For instance, mahallas are responsible for con-
ﬁrming the status of residents (the presence of vacant
homes, the registration of residents and other status-
related issues), administering payments for government
services and maintaining public order, among other tasks.
The opinions ofmahalla residents arewidely split regarding
the expanding functions of mahallas. A number of in-
dividuals beneﬁt from the strengthened roles of mahallas
and the greater diversity of mahalla responsibilities,
whereas other residents disapprove of this type of trans-
formation of the mahalla structure.
As noted below, individuals who approve of the
strengthened role of the mahalla largely welcome this
change because it has provided support for their own lives.
The Soviet-eramahalla had a rather low proﬁle. In terms
of the substance of the system back then, rather than
going to a mahalla to resolve problems, it was more
effective to report any issues to a government agency or
a chapter of the Communist Party.
I believe the current strengthening of the mahalla is a
good thing. Compared with the people in other
governmental agencies, the people inmahallas aremore
familiar with the situations in individual districts and
can render fairer judgements. For example, because my
daughter hasn’t been living in an apartment unit that
she owns for the past half year, she ﬁgured she shouldn’t
have to pay a resident’s tax on that property. The
mahalla certiﬁed that she is not living at that residence
now, with the mahalla committee stamping that cer-
tiﬁcate. If my daughter had gone to a government
agency instead of the mahalla, there is no doubt that it
would have been a major chore to collect all the
required papers (documents) together for this purpose
(Respondent No. 1, Uzbek male from Tashkent).
People who approve of the new roles of the mahalla
stress the changes in the administrative methods of the
mahalla and the fact that large numbers of individuals
can become involved in the responsibilities of modern
mahallas. In the traditional mahallas of the Soviet era, a
number of elders acted to address the various problems
encountered in their neighbourhoods. By contrast, both the
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tives have become extremely diverse. These representa-
tives are no longer limited to the ranks of elderly persons
who possess rich experience and wisdom; instead, younger
individuals and women are also beginning to serve as
mahalla representatives. In the opinion of an elder at a
particular mahalla, changes of this type are producing
greater clarity in the new positioning of mahallas within
their societies. Furthermore, this particular elder empha-
sises that in the future, all problems that emerge within
communities will be resolved by mahalla committees.
The Soviet-era mahallas were informal organisations.
For example, elders would be selected, and all of them
would gather together to discuss weddings, funerals
and other occasions and matters. If an argument or a
quarrel broke out at someone’s house, an elder would
visit that residence to intervene and attempt to mediate
the situation.
The composition of the mahalla has changed in recent
years. In the case of a mahalla with 500 or more house-
holds, for example, salaries are actually paid to the rep-
resentatives and counsellors, and the ‘mahalla posboni’
(neighbourhood watch) system has been introduced. In
this way, the mahallas have steadily been altered from
their former informal capacity to the role of ofﬁcial or-
ganisations that operate within a certain format. The
importance of the mahalla will increase henceforth,
underscoring the need to transform mahallas into or-
ganisations that are equipped to respond to all demands
of the residents in the near future.
Since I became a representative of this mahalla, abso-
lutely no one has complained about not having gas,
water or other services. This satisfaction arises because
we are handling these issues within the mahalla itself.
Over the years to come, I believe that we will see a sit-
uation develop in which the role of the local govern-
ment in our lives will decline; instead, people will come
to depend upon the mahalla for almost all of their needs
(Respondent No. 1, Uzbek male from Tashkent).4.3. From family-like bonding towards administrative units
However, opponents of modern mahallas insist that
mahallas have become institutions of the state that are no
longer pursing the best interests of mahalla residents.
These detractors state that roles that should typically be
fulﬁlled by government agencies are simply being forcibly
shifted to mahallas. One respondent described the recent
work behaviours of mahalla staffers in the following terms.
The recent concerns of mahalla staffers have largely
focussed on who is paying public service charges and
who is delinquent in such payments. As a result, I have
yet to see any staffers take it upon themselves to
attempt to provide help for residents who are truly
struggling to get by in daily life (Respondent No. 9,
Uzbek male from Tashkent).
One interviewee commented that the recent shifts
that have caused mahallas to function as governmentaladministrations threaten to change the essential meaning
of the mahalla and undermine human relations therein.
The merits of a Soviet-era mahalla, according to this indi-
vidual, were the warm feelings that were cultivated from
neighbourhood interactions rather than any aspect of the
administrative services of the mahalla.
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the mahalla
was the overwhelming sense of trust nurtured between
the people who lived in a mahalla. The doors of neigh-
bourhood homes, for instance, were always left open for
people to freely come and go. Following the shift to
having the functions of mahallas taken over by admin-
istrative agencies, however, these scenes have largely
vanished from neighbourhoods (Respondent No. 37,
Uzbek female from Tashkent).
Another respondent furnished the following observa-
tions; these insights are based on her belief that although
the functions of mahalla have been strengthened since
Uzbekistan achieved its independence, this shift has not
strengthened the bonds of trust among Uzbek residents.
She regrets, for example, the steady transformation of the
mahalla into the status of a state institution, and she notes
that this transformation is evident from the external ap-
pearances of buildings.
After gaining independence, the move to self-
government commenced to a certain degree, and the
slogan ‘Protect Your Own Land with Your Own Hands’
came into vogue. However, with developments such as
the Andijan incident (the 2005 clash in the city of
Andijan between the national army and forces opposed
to the government), windows were barred and steel
fences were built around buildings almost everywhere.
These barricades were erected to protect these struc-
tures from opposition forces, and the barriers severely
limited people’s access to the protected locations.
These barriers were obviously terrible with respect to
appearance, and it also became impossible to plant trees
around the mahalla buildings like before or to continue
to cultivate previously planted trees that had steadily
grown in size. This issue illustrates the fear that has
continued since the Soviet era and indicates that the
people have no freedom (Respondent No. 33, Tartar fe-
male from Andijan).
A similar sentiment was voiced by another respondent.
The mahallas of the 1960s to 1970s were very nice
places to live; however, modern mahallas are useless.
Women’s departments and posts for apartment man-
agers have been established; however, the cohesiveness
was different in the past because the mahallas used to
be managed by individuals whom we respected
(Respondent No. 32, Uzbek, Male, Andijan).
One of the reasons for these negative evaluations of the
mahalla, an institution that has been strengthened in
function and authority following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, is the lack of clarity in the division of roles between
mahallas and national government agencies. It has been
claimed that this ambiguity contributes to corruption in the
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mahalla activities.
The present-day mahallas (although supposedly non-
governmental organisations) have, in fact, become part
of the state. Yet despite that, their ties with state
agencies remain vague. If the mahallas function as one
aspect of state institutions, then it would be preferable
to openly note this fact. If, instead, they are organs of the
residents, this role should also be clearly deﬁned.
If you ask me, the primary intent of our mahalla is not to
protect the interests of the residents but, instead, to
come up with a steady stream of reasons for collecting
money from us. The other day, mahalla representatives
camearound tocollectmoney for repairing gaspipes, but
today, even the tiny ﬂow of gas that had been supplied is
no longer available. Not too long before the gas collec-
tion, a collection was made for what they claimed were
infrastructure repairs. This collection occurred after
frequent power outages andwas reportedly supposed to
ensure reliable supplies of electricity. Now, though, we
have no powerwhatsoever. This is truly disappointing to
me. I don’t think that the mahallas are necessary.
In my view, these services should be handled by national
government agencies, like they were before, and not by
the mahalla. If that’s not the case, then why are national
government agencies, county hokimiat (government of-
ﬁces) and other operations even necessary? As I sit here
talking now, what in the world are they doing? I really
have no idea at all what their function is supposed to be
(Respondent No. 9, Uzbek male from Tashkent).
Although there do appear to be situations in which the
mahalla committees provide assistance, it can be argued
that the authority that is allocated to the mahalla is not
generally accompanied by revenue sources that are sufﬁ-
cient to fulﬁl mahalla responsibilities. Certain respondents
have stated that this phenomenon drives frequent cases of
wrongdoing among mahalla staffers and that mahalla
corruption has become an everyday occurrence.
Everyone sitting in today’s mahalla (ofﬁces) can be said
to be receiving money (bribes). The reason for this sit-
uation can be found in their low salaries, which make it
impossible for them to really make ends meet.
I’ve never heard of any cases of these personnel
searching for low-income households to provide them
with assistance. The only people they help out are their
own friends or families with childrenwho are employed
in high-ranking posts. This assistance is offered because
if mahalla personnel become well liked by the children
of these families, the personnel will be able to get their
own affairs taken care of as well. If you want to receive
money in the future, nothing will ever happen if you
don’t put money in their pockets now. In essence,
therefore, all problems can be resolved as long as you
are willing to pay the going price (Respondent No. 46,
Tajik-Uzbek male from Bukhara Province).
Based on a variety of negative impressions, such as the
interviewee responses provided above, the fondness ofresidents in Uzbekistan for mahallas, entities that were
reborn after the end of the Soviet Union and have begun to
fulﬁl new functions, has weakened. There are also many
individuals who reject the very tradition of the mahalla
itself. These individuals believe that roles that are best
performed by a state institution should not be transferred
to mahallas but should instead be allocated to the appro-
priate government agencies. In the perspectives of these
individuals, mahallas have neither the capacity nor the
ﬁnancial resources to accomplish these governmental
tasks. The following testimony from an Uzbek who resides
in a mahalla is fairly symbolic of this stance.
From my perspective, although the format of today’s
mahalla has changed from the mahalla format that
existed during the Soviet era, both of these approaches
are difﬁcult to accept. I personally reject the very
premise of the existence of mahallas and regard them as
an unnecessary institution. Connections, bribery and
other types of corruption are rampant in modern
mahallas, and the mahalla leaders are unwilling to lift a
ﬁnger if there is no personal gain for them in doing so.
I believe the situation should revert to the way it was
during the era of the Soviet government; that is, all
public services and events within the mahalla should be
placed under the purview of the government. Although
the mahallas of the Soviet era operated totally through
the power of the residents, they didn’t really act to
resolve any major problems. For instance, if an elderly
resident fell ill, three members of the local mahalla
would visit that person’s home to inquire about the
state of their health. If the person was a low-income
earner and needed assistance, the mahalla leaders
would collect whatever money they could from the
residents in the community and take it to the sick per-
son’s house. These actions were about the extent of
what they did, and I feel that this limited role was just
ﬁne (Respondent No. 4, Uzbek male from Tashkent).
In many previous inquiries into community life in Soviet
and post-Soviet times, scholars have emphasised the fact
that during the Soviet era, it was very challenging for in-
dividuals to maintain their values and traditions. In the
post-Soviet context, individuals are freer to express their
attachment to these traditional grass-roots organisations.
However, respondents to the current survey demonstrated
a contrasting perception to community life and community
organisations. Paradoxically, one can observe a weaker
public interest inmodern community life than in Soviet-era
mahallas and many nostalgic recollections of these Soviet-
era mahallas. One explanation for this phenomenon is in
accordance with Shlapentokh’s description of the rela-
tionship between Soviet institutions and elements of civil
society, which attributes a loss of interest among the
populace in the notions of public goods and participation in
communal activities to the failure of the Soviet state to
reward this type of participation in the community. As
demonstrated in this article, the passage of time, ideolog-
ical changes and increases in living standards have caused
interviewees to gradually shift their understanding of the
mahalla from a structure that involves “family-like
T. Dadabaev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 181–196 195bonding” to “just another institution of public administra-
tion”. The desire of the public to be involved in institutions
that work for the “public good” has decreased, and more
residents seek to avoid participating in this work.
5. Conclusions
Several conclusions can be reached based on the recol-
lections of ordinary people regarding Soviet-era mahallas
and theways inwhich thesemahallas can be comparedwith
modern communities. First, this study argues that mahallas
have existed in several different forms. This study attempted
to determine not only the “ofﬁcial” and “unofﬁcial” forms of
mahallas but also the different roles that these two types of
mahallas play with respect to the participation of citizens in
local governance. Unofﬁcial mahallas were identity agents;
relative to ofﬁcial mahallas, unofﬁcial mahallas were more
“unfocussed”, more tied to particular concerns and, to a
certain degree, more partisan. By contrast, ofﬁcial mahallas
served as organs of the local government. Unofﬁcial
mahallas are often recalled in thememories of interviewees
as the most attractive aspect of communal life during the
Soviet era. However, these interviewees generally have
negative impressions of ofﬁcial mahallas because these in-
stitutions represented the results and consequences of
governmental attempts to utilise the communicative and
information-sharing functions of mahallas to achieve the
purposes of the state administration.
Moreover, this paper investigated the multiplicity of
identities that mahallas can transcend among a populace
and whether mahalla-related attachments to neighbour-
hoods can be compared with any other types of attach-
ments, such as ethnic and religious connections. In this
respect, the communal identity that a mahalla offers to its
residents was analysed in the following two dimensions:
the role of the Soviet-era mahalla as a promoter and de-
fender of ethnic values within a community and the ways
in which the mahalla provided a residency-based inclusive
identity. Both of these expressions of identity appear to co-
exist in interviewees’ memories of Soviet-era mahallas.
As explained above, although these Soviet-era mahallas
were unofﬁcial community organisations based on tradi-
tional relationships among individuals, the situation in
modern Uzbekistan features the steady evolution of
mahallas towards the “ofﬁcialisation” ofmahalla structures.
The objective of the government in promoting this trend is
to organise the mahalla in ways that help compensate for
the existing inadequacies in governmental administrative
functions, thereby allowing various different issues to be
resolved at the resident level.
However, there is a lack of transparency in the relation-
ships between mahallas and the state. The mahallas sur-
vived the Soviet era and maintained their traditional
functions in part because they remained a separate exis-
tence from the government andwere relatively autonomous
structures that relied on voluntary participation by mahalla
residents. In modern mahallas, which have been trans-
formed into “ofﬁcial” institutions, mahalla committees have
effectively become administrative organs; these commit-
tees are resident self-governance organisations that attempt
to guarantee resident rights. Occasionally, governmentalintervention in the elections, policy-making procedures and
general activities of the mahalla committees will occur,
creating the impression among the public that these com-
mittees function more as government subcontractor bodies
than as resident self-governance organisations.
This situation relates to the gap between the ways in
which residents andgovernmental entities actually view the
mahalla. As demonstrated throughout portions of this
article, residents have very diverse attitudes towards
mahallas and the ways in which they should participate in
these community organisations. For that matter, the very
structure of the mahalla allowed mahalla residents to make
these choices. It has been long established that individuals
who either view participation in a mahalla as providing
beneﬁts to themselves or believe that the mahalla is an
aspect of their own sub-identities have assumed active roles
in their local mahalla. By contrast, individuals who do not
subscribe to either of these perspectives have enjoyed
the freedom to avoid participating in mahalla activities.
However, many respondents are concerned that as the
governmental policies to make the mahalla “ofﬁcial” and
“organised” become increasingly implemented, the de-
cisions of the mahalla will become obligatory, depriving
mahalla residents of the right to choose their levels of
participation in mahalla activities. In particular, because the
mahalla committees have recently begun to assumewelfare
responsibilities, auditing functions and various other duties,
people can now identify ever-fewer differences between
these steering committees and governmental administra-
tive agencies. Large numbers of residents have noted that
this shift towards “ofﬁcial” status for mahallas may damage
the traditional and long-cherished image of mahallas that
are based on spontaneous and voluntary actions.References
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